The preparation of monetary policy: essays on a multi-model approach
In: Financial and monetary policy studies v. 35
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In: Financial and monetary policy studies v. 35
In: Working paper series 11
In: Economic notes, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 1-35
ISSN: 1468-0300
Proponents of the so‐called New Economy claim that it entails a structural change of the economy. Such a change, in turn, would require the central bank to rethink its monetary policy to the extent that traditional relationships between inflation and economic growth are no longer valid. Such a rethinking, though, presupposes that prospective advances in information technology and other factors associated with the new economy do not threaten the capacity of central banks to stabilize the general level of prices. It is the aim of this paper to shed some light on the latter, by analysing the monetary transmission mechanism in a 'new economy' environment. We argue that, although the form of central bank instruments and current methods for implementing monetary policy may change, the goals that the policy makers try to achieve by employing these instruments remain valid, and achievable.
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 122-132
ISSN: 1465-7287
This article analyses the effects of monetary policy decisions on inflation expectations of European consumers. Using a novel approach, I convert qualitative survey responses of consumers in various European countries into a quantitative time series of inflation expectations. I investigate the effects of unanticipated movements in interest rates and inflation on inflation expectations across European countries. I inter alia seek to explore whether the reaction differs of consumers in countries with more credible central banks than those in less credible countries.
Proponents of the so-called New Economy claim that it entails a structural change of the economy. Such a change, in turn, would require the central bank to rethink its monetary policy to the extent that traditional relationships between inf1ation and economic growth are no longer valid. But such a rethinking presupposes that prospective advances in information technology and other factors associated with the new economy do not threaten the capacity of central banks to stabilise the general level of prices. It is the aim of this paper to shed some light on the latter, by analysing the monetary transmission mechanism in a 'new economy' environment. We argue that, although the form of central bank instruments and current methods for implementing monetary policy may change, the goals that the policy makers try to achieve by employing these instruments remain valid, and achievable.
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Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political) reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2 subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining the majority voting rule.
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In: IMF Working Paper, S. 1-28
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 791-801
In: European journal of political economy, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 791-801
ISSN: 1873-5703
We model monetary policy decisions as being taken by a group of heterogeneous policy makers, organized in a committee. Intuitively, when MPC members disclose and discuss the arguments behind their view on the interest rate, the quality of the collective decision should be higher compared to merely taking a simultaneous vote. We show that in some cases this intuition need not be correct. We also find that communication is a relatively effective way to implement the "knowledge pooling" argument in favor of collective decision-making, compared to expanding the size of a committee. Moreover, decision-making with internal communication appears generally more robust in situations when heterogeneity of members is not adequately captured by decision-making rules. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: Contemporary economic policy: a journal of Western Economic Association International, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 569-588
ISSN: 1465-7287
Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper, we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behavior of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on preprepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under Chairman Bernanke. (JEL E58, D71, D78)
Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke.
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1070
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Working paper
We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
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We investigate the implications for the setting of interest rateswhen monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in whicha subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the committeeand therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to voteunanimously ex post. We allow for different committee sizes, variousvoting rules and differences in skills among committee members. Wefind that the size of the committee is much less important in deter-mining the degree of interest rate inertia than the skills of committeemembers. Moreover, prior interaction of a subgroup only has a minoreffect on the setting of interest rates by the committee, provided thatmembers on average are equally skilled and voting takes place using asimple majority rule. If either of those assumptions are relaxed, priorinteraction has substantial effects on the setting of interest rates. Inaddition, prior interaction increases the optimal size of the Committee,ceteris paribus.
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In: De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 740
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